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S. N. Ethier∗ and Jiyeon Lee†
Abstract
We study Toral’s Parrondo games with N players and one-dimensional
spatial dependence as modified by Xie et al. Specifically, we use computer
graphics to sketch the Parrondo and anti-Parrondo regions for 3 ≤ N ≤ 9.
Our work was motivated by a recent paper of Li et al., who applied a state
space reduction method to this model, reducing the number of states from
2N to N + 1. We show that their reduced Markov chains are inconsistent
with the model of Xie et al.
Key words and phrases: Markov chain, equivalence class, lumpability,
dihedral group, Parrondo’s paradox, cooperative Parrondo games.
1 Introduction
The Parrondo effect refers to a reversal in direction of some system parameter
when two similar dynamics are combined. It was first described by J. M. R.
Parrondo in 1996 in the context of games of chance: He showed that there
exist two losing games that can be combined to win. The games were originally
intended as a pedagogical model of the flashing Brownian ratchet. Early work
focussed on capital-dependent (Harmer and Abbott [1]) and history-dependent
(Parrondo, Harmer, and Abbott [2]) games for a single player. Multi-player
games were introduced by Toral [3,4], including games with spatial dependence
and games with redistribution of wealth.
Toral’s [3] Parrondo games with one-dimensional spatial dependence rely on
an integer N ≥ 3 and three probability parameters, p0, p1, and p2. There are N
players labeled from 1 to N and arranged in a circle in clockwise order. At each
turn, one player is chosen at random to play. In game B, he tosses a pm-coin if
m of his two nearest neighbors are winners (m = 0, 1, 2). A player’s status as
winner or loser depends on the result of his most recent game. The player wins
one unit with heads and loses one unit with tails. The game can be initialized
arbitrarily. Game A is the special case of game B in which p0 = p1 = p2 = 1/2.
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For 0 < γ < 1, game C, often denoted by γA+ (1− γ)B, is a random mixture
of games A and B. (At each turn a coin with P(heads) = γ is tossed, and game
A is played if heads appears, game B if tails.) We let µA, µB , and µC be the
equilibrium mean profits per turn (to the ensemble of N players) in games A,
B, and C. Of course, µA = 0. We say that the Parrondo effect occurs if µB ≤ 0
and µC > 0 (two fair or losing games combine to win) and the anti-Parrondo
effect occurs if µB ≥ 0 and µC < 0 (two fair or winning games combine to lose).
Mihailovic´ and Rajkovic´ [5] modeled the three games by introducing Markov
chains in a state space with 2N states. They were able to study the games
analytically for N ≤ 12. Ethier and Lee [6] used a state space reduction method
that allowed them to study the games analytically for N ≤ 19, an improvement
that led to the conjecture that the mean profits µB and µC converge as N →∞.
(This was subsequently proved in [7] under certain conditions.) Xie et al. [8]
introduced a more spatially dependent version of game A, which we will refer
to as game A′. This game amounts to a loss of one unit by a randomly chosen
player together with a win of one unit by a randomly chosen nearest neighbor
of that player. (This differs from the description in [8] but it is probabilistically
equivalent.) Li et al. [9] used a state space reduction method to study games
A′, B, and C ′ := γA′ + (1− γ)B analytically. However, their method results in
Markov chains that are not directly related to the model of Xie et al.
Let us explain what we mean by state space reduction, and what is required
for it to be successful.
In general, consider an equivalence relation ∼ on a finite set E. By definition,
∼ is reflexive (x ∼ x), symmetric (x ∼ y implies y ∼ x), and transitive (x ∼ y
and y ∼ z imply x ∼ z). It is well known that an equivalence relation partitions
the set E into equivalence classes. The set of all equivalence classes, called the
quotient set, will be denoted by E¯. Let us write [x] := {y ∈ E : y ∼ x} for the
equivalence class containing x. Then E¯ = {[x] : x ∈ E}.
Now suppose X0, X1, X2, . . . is a (time-homogeneous) Markov chain in E
with transition matrix P . In particular, P (x, y) = P(Xt+1 = y | Xt = x) for all
x, y ∈ E and t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Under what conditions on P is [X0], [X1], [X2], . . . a
Markov chain in the “reduced” state space E¯? A sufficient condition, apparently
due to Kemeny and Snell [10, p. 124], is that P be lumpable with respect to ∼.
By definition, this means that, for all x, x′, y ∈ E,
x ∼ x′ implies
∑
y′∈[y]
P (x, y′) =
∑
y′∈[y]
P (x′, y′). (1)
Moreover, if (1) holds, then the Markov chain [X0], [X1], [X2], . . . in E¯ has tran-
sition matrix P¯ given by
P¯ ([x], [y]) :=
∑
y′∈[y]
P (x, y′). (2)
Notice that (1) ensures that (2) is well defined.
For Parrondo games with one-dimensional spatial dependence, the state
2
space, assuming N ≥ 3 players, is
E := {x = (x1, x2, . . . , xN ) : xi ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1, . . . , N} = {0, 1}N ,
which has 2N states. A state x ∈ E describes the status of each of the N
players, 0 for losers and 1 for winners. We can also think of E as the set of
N -bit binary representations of the integers 0, 1, . . . , 2N − 1, thereby giving a
natural ordering to the vectors in E.
Ethier and Lee [6] used the following equivalence relation on E: x ∼ y if
and only if y = xσ := (xσ(1), . . . , xσ(N)) for a permutation σ of (1, 2, . . . , N)
belonging to the dihedral group G of order 2N generated by the rotations and
reflections of the players. They verified the lumpability condition, with the
result that the size of the state space was reduced by a factor of nearly 2N
for large N . It should be noted that a sufficient condition for the lumpability
condition in this setting is
P (x,y) = P (xσ,yσ) for all σ ∈ G (3)
or for all σ in a subset of G that generates G.
Li et al. [9] reduced the state space much further by effectively using the
following equivalence relation on E: x ∼ y if and only if y = xσ for some
permutation σ of (1, 2, . . . , N). Equivalently, x ∼ y if and only if x and y have
the same number of 1s. However, here the lumpability condition fails. (This
is intuitively clear because the equivalence relation does not respect the spatial
structure of the players.) Thus, the Markov chains in E¯ constructed in [9],
which are based on
P¯ ([x], [y]) :=
1
|[x]|
∑
x′∈[x]
[ ∑
y′∈[y]
P (x′, y′)
]
(4)
rather than (2), are not directly related to the model of Xie et al. [8]. To put it
another way, there is no theoretical basis for such Markov chains and the results
derived from them.
Our aim in this paper is not simply to point out a weakness in earlier work,
but to provide accurate results as well for the model of Toral [3] as modified by
Xie et al. [8].
Actually, as originally formulated, the model had four probability parame-
ters p0, p1, p2, and p3 corresponding to the various configurations of the two
nearest neighbors, namely (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), and (1, 1). However, we assume
throughout that p1 = p2 (and we relabel the remaining parameters p0, p1, p3
as p0, p1, p2). There are three reasons for doing this. First, the Parrondo re-
gion is a subset of the parameter space, and a three-dimensional region is easier
to visualize than a four-dimensional one. Second, the equivalence relation of
Ethier and Lee [6] described above requires this assumption (otherwise the di-
hedral group of order 2N would have to be replaced by a cyclic group of order
N and the state space reduction would be less effective). Third, all previous
computational works on Parrondo games with one-dimensional spatial depen-
dence [3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11] have made this assumption.
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The smallest number of players for which there is a distinction between the
equivalence relation of [6] and that of [9] is N = 4, so we consider that case
first in Section 2. We treat the general case by the method of [6] in Section 3
and by the method of [9] in Section 4. In Section 5 we use computer graphics
to sketch the Parrondo and anti-Parrondo regions for 3 ≤ N ≤ 9 as well as
their approximations based on the methods of Li et al. [9]. Finally, Section 6
summarizes the main conclusions.
2 The case N = 4
To make this less abstract, let us consider separately the case of four players, that
is, N = 4. We begin with game B. The Markov chain in E for game B depends
on three parameters, p0, p1, p2 ∈ [0, 1], so that the parameter space is the unit
cube [0, 1]3. There are 16 states (namely, the four-bit binary representations of
the integers 0–15) and the transition matrix has the form
PB :=
1
4

d0 p0 p0 0 p0 0 0 0 p0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
q0 d1 0 p1 0 p0 0 0 0 p1 0 0 0 0 0 0
q0 0 d2 p1 0 0 p1 0 0 0 p0 0 0 0 0 0
0 q1 q1 d3 0 0 0 p1 0 0 0 p1 0 0 0 0
q0 0 0 0 d4 p0 p1 0 0 0 0 0 p1 0 0 0
0 q0 0 0 q0 d5 0 p2 0 0 0 0 0 p2 0 0
0 0 q1 0 q1 0 d6 p1 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 0
0 0 0 q1 0 q2 q1 d7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2
q0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 d8 p1 p0 0 p1 0 0 0
0 q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 q1 d9 0 p1 0 p1 0 0
0 0 q0 0 0 0 0 0 q0 0 d10 p2 0 0 p2 0
0 0 0 q1 0 0 0 0 0 q1 q2 d11 0 0 0 p2
0 0 0 0 q1 0 0 0 q1 0 0 0 d12 p1 p1 0
0 0 0 0 0 q2 0 0 0 q1 0 0 q1 d13 0 p2
0 0 0 0 0 0 q1 0 0 0 q2 0 q1 0 d14 p2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 q2 0 0 0 q2 0 q2 q2 d15

,
where the diagonal entries are chosen to make the row sums equal to 1:
d0 := 4q0,
d1 = d2 = d4 = d8 := p0 + q0 + 2q1,
d3 = d6 = d9 = d12 := 2(p1 + q1),
d5 = d10 := 2(p0 + q2),
d7 = d11 = d13 = d14 := 2p1 + p2 + q2,
d15 := 4p2,
and qm := 1 − pm for m = 0, 1, 2. This is consistent with Eq. (12) of Xie et
al. [8].
For the equivalence relation of [6] mentioned above, there are six equiva-
lence classes, namely {0000}, {0001, 0010, 0100, 1000}, {0011, 0110, 1001, 1100},
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{0101, 1010}, {0111, 1011, 1101, 1110}, and {1111}. The lumpability condition
is easily verified. For example, denoting the states by their decimal represen-
tations (0–15), the equivalence classes are {0}, {1, 2, 4, 8}, {3, 6, 9, 12}, {5, 10},
{7, 11, 13, 14}, and {15}, and the probabilities of a transition from a state in the
equivalence class {3, 6, 9, 12} to the equivalence class itself are∑
j=3,6,9,12
PB(3, j) = (p1 + q1)/2,
∑
j=3,6,9,12
PB(6, j) = (p1 + q1)/2,∑
j=3,6,9,12
PB(9, j) = (p1 + q1)/2,
∑
j=3,6,9,12
PB(12, j) = (p1 + q1)/2,
which are equal. Moreover, the reduced transition matrix (with rows and
columns labeled by the equivalence classes and ordered as just indicated) is
P¯B =
1
4

4q0 4p0 0 0 0 0
q0 p0 + q0 + 2q1 2p1 p0 0 0
0 2q1 2(p1 + q1) 0 2p1 0
0 2q0 0 2(p0 + q2) 2p2 0
0 0 2q1 q2 2p1 + p2 + q2 p2
0 0 0 0 4q2 4p2
 .
(5)
Both matrices, PB and P¯B , can be simplified (using pm+qm = 1 for m = 0, 1, 2),
but there is a good reason to leave them in this form for now, as we will see.
For the equivalence relation of [9] mentioned above, there are five equivalence
classes, namely {0000}, {0001, 0010, 0100, 1000}, {0011, 0101, 0110, 1001, 1010,
1100}, {0111, 1011, 1101, 1110}, and {1111}. The lumpability condition fails.
For example, denoting the states by their decimal representations (0–15), the
probabilities of a transition from a state in the equivalence class {3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12}
to the equivalence class itself are∑
j=3,5,6,9,10,12
PB(3, j) = (p1 + q1)/2,
∑
j=3,5,6,9,10,12
PB(5, j) = (p0 + q2)/2,∑
j=3,5,6,9,10,12
PB(6, j) = (p1 + q1)/2,
∑
j=3,5,6,9,10,12
PB(9, j) = (p1 + q1)/2,∑
j=3,5,6,9,10,12
PB(10, j) = (p0 + q2)/2,
∑
j=3,5,6,9,10,12
PB(12, j) = (p1 + q1)/2,
which are not, in general, equal. The idea of Li et al. [9] is to use the average
of these probabilities, namely (p0 + 2p1 + 2q1 + q2)/6, in P¯B (cf. (4)):
P¯B =
1
12

12q0 12p0 0 0 0
3q0 3(p0 + q0 + 2q1) 3(p0 + 2p1) 0 0
0 2(q0 + 2q1) 2(p0 + 2p1 + 2q1 + q2) 2(2p1 + p2) 0
0 0 3(2q1 + q2) 3(2p1 + p2 + q2) 3p2
0 0 0 12q2 12p2
 ,
(6)
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which is consistent with Eq. (3) of Li et al. [9].
Next we need some notation. We denote by P˙B the matrix PB with qm
replaced by −qm for m = 0, 1, 2. Similarly, we denote by ˙¯PB the matrix P¯B
with qm replaced by −qm for m = 0, 1, 2. Let piB be the unique stationary
distribution of PB , and let p¯iB be the unique stationary distribution of P¯B .
(We assume that they exist, which rules out certain boundary cases such as
p0 = 0, p1 arbitrary, and p2 = 1.) Then, as shown in [6] using the lumpability
property (see [11] for more detail), the mean profit per turn in game B is given
by
µB = piBP˙B1 = p¯iB
˙¯PB1, (7)
where 1 is the column vector of 1s of the appropriate dimension. This equation
shows that, as far as µB is concerned, nothing is lost in reducing the state space
from E to E¯, provided the lumpability condition is satisfied (as in the case
of (5)). However, when this condition is not satisfied (as in the case of (6)),
the relationship between PB and P¯B is less clear, and in particular the second
equation in (7) fails.
Straightforward computations yield, for the equivalence relation of [6],
µB = [−(3− 2p2 − 3p20 + 2p0p2 − p22 + 2p20p2 − 2p0p22)
+ 4(1 + p0)(1− p0 + p2)(1− p2)p1 − 2(1− p0 + p2)(1− p0 − p2)p21]
/[3 + 6p0 − 2p2 − 3p20 − 2p0p2 − p22 + 12p20p2 − 4p0p22 − 8p20p22
− 4(1− p0 + p2 + 2p20 + 2p0p2)(1− p2)p1
+ 2(1 + 4p0 − p20 − 2p0p2 − p22)p21]. (8)
On the other hand, if we use the equivalence relation of [9], we can compute
the right-hand side of (7), but it yields only an approximation of µB , which we
denote by µˆB :
µˆB = [−(9 + 6p0 − 12p2 − 3p20 − 8p0p2 + 3p22 + 2p20p2 + 2p0p22)
+ 2(6 + 5p0 − 7p2 + p20 − 4p0p2 + p22)p1 − 4(1− p0 − p2)p21]
/[9 + 24p0 − 12p2 + 9p20 − 32p0p2 + 3p22 − 8p20p2 + 8p0p22
− 2(6− p0 − 7p2 − p20 + p22)p1 + 4(1 + p0 − p2)p21]. (9)
The fair surface µB = 0 based on (8) and its approximation µˆB = 0 based on
(9) are graphed in Figure 1(a). The difference is significant.
We turn next to game A′. Again there are 16 states (namely, the 4-bit binary
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) The fair surface µB = 0 for game B with N = 4 is displayed in
green, while its approximation µˆB = 0 is displayed in red. (b) The fair surface
µC′ = 0 for game C
′ with N = 4 and γ = 1/2 is displayed in green, while its
approximation µˆC′ = 0 is displayed in red.
representations of the integers 0–15) and the transition matrix has the form
PA′ :=
1
8

0 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 2 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 2 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 2 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 1 2 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 0

.
The corresponding matrix in Eq. (3) of Xie et al. [8] has errors at six of the 256
entries. Labeling rows and columns by 0–15, the errors occur at entries (5, 3),
(5, 12), (10, 2), (10, 12), (15, 7), and (15, 9).
Using the equivalence relation of [6] with six equivalence classes, the lumpa-
bility condition holds and the reduced transition matrix (with rows and columns
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labeled by the equivalence classes and ordered as previously indicated) is
P¯A′ =
1
4

0 4 0 0 0 0
0 2 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 2 2 0 0
0 0 1 1 2 0
0 0 0 0 4 0
 . (10)
Using the equivalence relation of [9] with five equivalence classes, the lumpa-
bility condition fails, but using (4) yields the transition matrix
P¯A′ =
1
6

0 6 0 0 0
0 3 3 0 0
0 1 4 1 0
0 0 3 3 0
0 0 0 6 0
 (11)
as in Eq. (1) of Li et al. [9].
The transition matrices corresponding to game C ′ := γA′ + (1− γ)B are
PC′ := γPA′ + (1− γ)PB and P¯C′ := γP¯A′ + (1− γ)P¯B .
Let piC′ be the unique stationary distribution of PC′ , and let p¯iC′ be the unique
stationary distribution of P¯C′ . Since every play of game A
′ results in a profit
of 0 to the ensemble of four players, P˙A′ = 0 and
˙¯PA′ = 0 and hence
P˙C′ = (1− γ)P˙B and ˙¯PC′ = (1− γ) ˙¯PB .
This allows us to evaluate
µC′ = piC′P˙C′1 = p¯iC′
˙¯PC′1. (12)
Let us assume that γ = 1/2. Using the equivalence relation of [6], we find
from (12) that
µC′ = [−3(105− 35p0 − 65p2 − 22p20 + 8p0p2 + 2p22 + 6p20p2 − 2p0p22)
+ 6(55 + 2p0 − 4p2 − 9p20 + 12p0p2 − 9p22 + 4p20p2 − 4p0p22)p1
− 12(2− p0 + p2)(1− p0 − p2)p21]
/[2(315 + 175p0 − 125p2 − 22p20 − 10p0p2 − 12p22 + 48p20p2 − 32p0p22
− 16p20p22)− 4(25− 2p0 + 8p2 + 17p20 + 12p0p2 − 13p22 − 8p20p2
− 8p0p22)p1 + 8(14 + 7p0 − 3p2 − p20 − 2p0p2 − p22)p21], (13)
whereas, using the equivalence relation of [9], the right-hand side of (12) yields
the approximation
µˆC′ = [−3(56− p0 − 45p2 − 7p20 − 8p0p2 + 7p22 + 2p20p2 + 2p0p22)
8
+ 6(33 + 14p0 − 16p2 + p20 − 4p0p2 + p22)p1 − 12(1− p0 − p2)p21]
/[2(168 + 137p0 − 107p2 + 19p20 − 80p0p2 + 13p22 − 8p20p2 + 8p0p22)
− 4(15− 6p0 − 12p2 − p20 + p22)p1 + 8(3 + p0 − p2)p21]. (14)
The fair surface µC′ = 0 based on (13) and its approximation µˆC′ = 0 based on
(14) are graphed in Figure 1(b) above. The difference is again significant.
We can use the formulas found above to sketch the Parrondo and anti-
Parrondo regions for games A′, B, and C ′. This is done in Figure 2. We notice
a curious feature of the regions that did not appear for games A, B, and C.
When projected onto the (p0, p2) plane, there is a small apparently circular
region in which the Parrondo and anti-Parrondo regions on opposite sides on
the line p0 + p2 = 1 are inverted. However, this region is neither circular nor
elliptical, but rather is determined by a polynomial of degree 8 in p0 and p2.
Figure 2: For N = 4 and γ = 1/2, the blue surface is the surface µB = 0,
and the red surface is the surface µC′ = 0, in the (p0, p2, p1) unit cube. The
Parrondo region is the region on or below the blue surface and above the red
surface, while the anti-Parrondo region is the region on or above the blue surface
and below the red surface. The second figure is an enlargement of a portion of
the first.
3 Reduction by reflections and rotations
The Markov chain formalized by Mihailovic´ and Rajkovic´ [5] keeps track of the
status (loser or winner, 0 or 1) of each of the N ≥ 3 players of game B, which
was described in Section 1. Its state space is the product space
E := {x = (x1, x2, . . . , xN ) : xi ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1, . . . , N} = {0, 1}N
with 2N states. Let mi(x) := xi−1 + xi+1, or, in other words, let mi(x) be the
number of winners among the two nearest neighbors of player i when the state
is x. Of course x0 := xN and xN+1 := x1 because of the circular arrangement of
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players. Also, let xi be the element of E equal to x except at the ith component.
For example, x1 := (1− x1, x2, x3, . . . , xN ).
The one-step transition matrix PB for this Markov chain depends not only
on N but on three parameters, p0, p1, p2 ∈ [0, 1]. It has the form
PB(x,x
i) :=
{
N−1pmi(x) if xi = 0,
N−1qmi(x) if xi = 1,
i = 1, . . . , N, x ∈ E,
and
PB(x,x) := N
−1
( ∑
i:xi=0
qmi(x) +
∑
i:xi=1
pmi(x)
)
, x ∈ E,
where qm := 1− pm for m = 0, 1, 2 and empty sums are 0. The Markov chain is
irreducible and aperiodic if 0 < pm < 1 for m = 0, 1, 2. Under slightly weaker
assumptions (see [7]), the Markov chain is ergodic, which suffices. For example,
if p0 = 1 and 0 < pm < 1 for m = 1, 2, or if 0 < pm < 1 for m = 0, 1 and p2 = 0,
then ergodicity holds.
The Markov chain of Xie et al. [8] keeps track of the status (loser or winner,
0 or 1) of each of the N ≥ 3 players of game A′. Recall that a player is chosen at
random, and he then loses one unit while a randomly chosen nearest neighbor
of that player wins one unit. Its state space is again E. For i = 1, 2, . . . , N , let
xi,1 be the element of E whose jth component is equal to xj if j 6= i, i+ 1, 0 if
j = i, and 1 if j = i+1; and let xi,−1 be the element of E whose jth component
is equal to xj if j 6= i, i − 1, 0 if j = i, and 1 if j = i − 1. Of course x0 := xN
and xN+1 := x1. For example, x
1,−1 := (0, x2, x3, . . . , xN−1, 1). Starting from
state x ∈ E, player i is chosen with probability 1/N , and a transition to state
xi,1 or state xi,−1 occurs, each with probability 1/2.
The one-step transition matrix PA′ for this Markov chain in E therefore has
the form
PA′(x,y) := (2N)
−1
N∑
i=1
[δ(xi,−1,y) + δ(xi,1,y)],
where δ(x,y) is the Kronecker delta (δ(x,y) := 1 if x = y; δ(x,y) := 0 oth-
erwise). The Markov chain is not irreducible because states 0 and 1 cannot
be reached, but it does have a unique stationary distribution because it is irre-
ducible when restricted to E − {0,1}.
Using the equivalence relation of Ethier and Lee [6], we can verify the lumpa-
bility condition (3) for the transition matrix PB by checking that
PB(xσ, (x
i)σ) = PB(xσ, (xσ)
σ−1(i))
=
{
N−1pmσ−1(i)(xσ) if (xσ)σ−1(i) = 0,
N−1qmσ−1(i)(xσ) if (xσ)σ−1(i) = 1,
=
{
N−1pmi(x) if xi = 0,
N−1qmi(x) if xi = 1,
= PB(x,x
i),
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where the third equality uses
mi(xσ) = mσ(i)(x). (15)
We can verify that (15) holds for (σ(1), . . . , σ(N)) = (2, 3, . . . , N, 1) and for
(σ(1), . . . , σ(N)) = (N,N − 1, . . . , 2, 1), which suffices because these two per-
mutations generate G.
For PA′ , we can verify the lumpability condition (3) by observing that, if
(σ(1), . . . , σ(N)) = (2, 3, . . . , N, 1), then
PA′(xσ,yσ) = (2N)
−1
N∑
i=1
[δ((xσ)
i,−1,yσ) + δ((xσ)i,1,yσ)]
= (2N)−1
N∑
i=1
[δ((xσ)
σ−1(i),−1,yσ) + δ((xσ)σ
−1(i),1,yσ)]
= (2N)−1
N∑
i=1
[δ((xi,−1)σ,yσ) + δ((xi,1)σ,yσ)]
= (2N)−1
N∑
i=1
[δ(xi,−1,y) + δ(xi,1,y)]
= PA′(x,y)
since (xσ)
σ−1(i),s = (xi,s)σ. If (σ(1), . . . , σ(N)) = (N,N − 1, . . . , 2, 1), then the
same sequence of identities holds, the only distinction being that (xσ)
σ−1(i),s =
(xi,−s)σ. Since the lumpability condition is satisfied for PA′ , it is also satisfied
for PC′ .
A fairly explicit formula for P¯B is given in [6]. First, define the function
s : E¯ 7→ {0, 1, . . . , N} by s([x]) := x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xN ; it counts the number of
1s in each element of an equivalence class. Then
P¯B([x], [y]) =

N−1
(∑
i:xi=0
qmi(x) +
∑
i:xi=1
pmi(x)
)
if [y] = [x]
N−1
∑
i:xi=1,xi∼y qmi(x) if s([y]) = s([x])− 1
N−1
∑
i:xi=0,xi∼y pmi(x) if s([y]) = s([x]) + 1
0 otherwise
for all [x], [y] ∈ E¯. This generalizes (5). A formula for P¯A′ is
P¯A′([x], [y]) =
{
(2N)−1
∑N
i=1
(
1[y](x
i,−1) + 1[y](xi,1)
)
if |s([y])− s([x])| ≤ 1
0 otherwise
for all [x], [y] ∈ E¯. This generalizes (10).
As in Section 2, let piB be the unique stationary distribution of PB , and let
p¯iB be the unique stationary distribution of P¯B . We denote by P˙B the matrix
PB with qm replaced by −qm for m = 0, 1, 2. Similarly, we denote by ˙¯PB the
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matrix P¯B with qm replaced by −qm for m = 0, 1, 2. Then the mean profit per
turn in game B is given by
µB = piBP˙B1 = p¯iB
˙¯PB1.
The transition matrices corresponding to game C ′ := γA′ + (1− γ)B are
PC′ := γPA′ + (1− γ)PB and P¯C′ := γP¯A′ + (1− γ)P¯B .
Let piC′ be the unique stationary distribution of PC′ , and let p¯iC′ be the unique
stationary distribution of P¯C′ . Since every play of game A
′ results in a profit
of 0 to the ensemble of N players, P˙A′ = 0 and
˙¯PA′ = 0 and hence
P˙C′ = (1− γ)P˙B and ˙¯PC′ = (1− γ) ˙¯PB .
Then the mean profit per turn in game C ′ is given by
µC′ = piC′P˙C′1 = p¯iC′
˙¯PC′1. (16)
There is a technical issue that must be addressed to fully justify our results.
The strong law of large numbers of Ethier and Lee [12] does not apply directly
because the payoffs are not completely specified by the one-step transitions of
the Markov chain. (For example, a transition from x to x could correspond to
a payoff of −1 or 1 in game B; −1, 0, or 1 in game C ′.) We addressed this issue
for game B in [6] by augmenting the state space. A similar approach, but with
a different augmentation, works for game C ′. We let E∗ := E ×{1, 2, . . . , N}×
{1, 2}. The state is (x, i, g) ∈ E∗ if x describes the status of each player, i is
the label of the next player to play, and g is the next game to be played (g = 1
for game A and g = 2 for game B). The new one-step transition matrix P ∗C′
has the form
P ∗C′((x, i, 2), (x
i, j, h)) =
{
N−1γ(h)pmi(x) if xi = 0,
N−1γ(h)qmi(x) if xi = 1,
P ∗C′((x, i, 2), (x, j, h)) =
{
N−1γ(h)qmi(x) if xi = 0,
N−1γ(h)pmi(x) if xi = 1,
P ∗C′((x, i, 1), (y, j, h)) = N
−1γ(h)[δ(xi,−1,y) + δ(xi,1,y)]/2,
where γ(1) := γ and γ(2) := 1 − γ. For each transition there is an associated
payoff, specifically
w((x, i, 2), (y, j, h)) :=
{
1 if (y = xi, xi = 0) or (y = x, xi = 1),
−1 if (y = x, xi = 0) or (y = xi, xi = 1),
and w((x, i, 1), (y, j, h)) = 0. This allows us to show that µC′ = pi
∗
C′P˙
∗
C′1 using
the SLLN and pi∗C′P˙
∗
C′1 = piC′P˙C′1 = p¯iC′
˙¯PC′1, from which (16) follows.
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4 Reduction to the number of winners
Assuming the equivalence relation in which two states in E are equivalent if they
have the same number of 1s, Li et al. [9] found some rather elegant formulas
for the matrices P¯A′ and P¯B (defined using (4)). Both are tridiagonal matrices
with rows and columns indexed by E¯ := {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}.
Specifically,
P¯A′(i, i+ 1) =
(
N−2
i
)(
N
i
) , i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, (17)
P¯A′(i, i− 1) =
(
N−2
i−2
)(
N
i
) , i = 1, 2, . . . , N,
where
(
N−2
N−1
)
=
(
N−2
−1
)
:= 0, and
P¯A′(i, i) = 1− P¯A′(i, i+ 1)− P¯A′(i, i− 1), i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, (18)
and P¯A′(0, 0) = P¯A′(N,N) = 0. This generalizes (11).
Moreover,
P¯B(i, i+ 1) =
(
N−3
i
)
p0 + 2
(
N−3
i−1
)
p1 +
(
N−3
i−2
)
p2(
N
i
) , i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1,
P¯B(i, i− 1) =
(
N−3
i−1
)
q0 + 2
(
N−3
i−2
)
q1 +
(
N−3
i−3
)
q2(
N
i
) , i = 1, 2, . . . , N,
where
(
N−3
N−1
)
=
(
N−3
N−2
)
=
(
N−3
−1
)
=
(
N−3
−2
)
:= 0 and qm := 1− pm for m = 0, 1, 2;
finally,
P¯B(i, i) =
(
N−3
i
)
q0 + 2
(
N−3
i−1
)
q1 +
(
N−3
i−2
)
q2(
N
i
) + (N−3i−1 )p0 + 2(N−3i−2 )p1 + (N−3i−3 )p2(
N
i
) ,
i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, (19)
and P¯B(0, 0) = q0 and P¯B(N,N) = p2. (Defining P¯B(i, i) directly instead of as
a complementary probability as in (18) simplifies the definition of ˙¯PB .) This
generalizes (6).
Since Li et al. [9] did not include proofs, we sketch a proof of (17): Consider
a uniformly distributed sequence of 0s and 1s of length N . Then
P¯A′(i, i+ 1)
= (1/2)E[proportion of positions with a 0 preceded by a 0 | i 1s]
+ (1/2)E[proportion of positions with a 0 followed by a 0 | i 1s]
= (2N)−1E[number of positions with a 0 preceded by a 0 | i 1s]
+ (2N)−1E[number of positions with a 0 followed by a 0 | i 1s]
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= P(0s in positions N − 1 and N | i 1s)
=
(
N−2
i
)(
N
i
) ,
where the third equality uses an exchangeability argument. The other formulas
are proved analogously.
These equations determine P¯C′ := γP¯A′ + (1− γ)P¯B . As before, we denote
by ˙¯PB the matrix P¯B with qm replaced by −qm for m = 0, 1, 2. Since every
play of game A′ results in a profit of 0 to the ensemble of N players, ˙¯PA′ = 0
and hence
˙¯PC′ = (1− γ) ˙¯PB .
Let p¯iB be the unique stationary distribution of P¯B on E¯, and let p¯iC′ be the
unique stationary distribution of P¯C′ on E¯. This allows us to evaluate
µˆB := p¯iB
˙¯PB1 and µˆC′ := p¯iC′
˙¯PC′1. (20)
These are the approximations of Li et al. [9] to the exact µB and µC′ .
As in Section 3, the strong law of large numbers in [12] does not apply
directly, so the Markov chains in E¯ described above must be augmented. We
explain the procedure for game B; the procedure for game C ′ is similar. We let
E¯∗ := E¯ × {−1, 1}. The state is (i, w) ∈ E¯∗ if i is the number of 1s and w is
the profit obtained in the transition to state i. In (19), notice that P¯B(i, i) is
the sum of two fractions, which we denote by P¯ ′B(i, i) and P¯
′′
B(i, i), respectively.
The new one-step transition matrix P¯ ∗B has the form
P¯ ∗B((i, w), (i+ 1, 1)) = P¯B(i, i+ 1),
P¯ ∗B((i, w), (i+ 1,−1)) = 0,
P¯ ∗B((i, w), (i− 1, 1)) = 0,
P¯ ∗B((i, w), (i− 1,−1)) = P¯B(i, i− 1),
P¯ ∗B((i, w), (i, 1)) = P¯
′′
B(i, i),
P¯ ∗B((i, w), (i,−1)) = P¯ ′B(i, i).
This allows us to show that µˆB = p¯i
∗
B
˙¯P ∗B1 using the SLLN and p¯i
∗
B
˙¯P ∗B1 =
p¯iB
˙¯PB1, from which the first equation in (20) follows.
5 The Parrondo region
We can now compare the Parrondo regions for games A′, B, and C ′ of Xie et
al. [8] with those for games A, B, and C of Toral [3]. We can also compare
the Parrondo regions for games A′, B, and C ′ computed exactly with those
computed using the approximation of Li et al. [9]. Let us first compare them for
certain parameter values. Table 1 assumes that (p0, p1, p2) = (1, 4/25, 7/10), as
did Toral [3]. We can compute mean profits for 3 ≤ N ≤ 19. Notice that the
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Parrondo effect appears for games A, B, and C, as well as for games A′, B, and
C ′, when N = 5, 6 and N ≥ 9. However, the approximate formulas give a very
different conclusion: There is no effect for N ≤ 15, an anti-Parrondo effect for
16 ≤ N ≤ 28, and no effect for N ≥ 29. Tables 2 and 3 treat the two other cases
studied in [6]. In both cases the Parrondo effect appears for games A, B, and C
as well as for games A′, B, and C ′, at least for N ≥ 6, whereas the approximate
formulas yield misleading results.
Table 1: Analysis of the Parrondo effect for Toral’s choice of the probability
parameters, (p0, p1, p2) = (1, 4/25, 7/10). µB , µC , and µC′ are mean profits for
games B, C, and C ′ with γ = 1/2. µˆB and µˆC′ are the approximations due to
Li et al. [9] of µB and µC′ . Numbers have been rounded to six significant digits.
N µB µˆB µC µC′ µˆC′
3 −0.0909091 −0.0909091 −0.0183774 −0.0766158 −0.0766158
4 0.0799608 −0.0218156 0.0171357 0.0156538 −0.0424145
5 −0.00219465 −0.0136466 0.00405176 0.00565126 −0.0293182
6 −0.0189247 −0.0101518 0.00463310 0.01343312 −0.0219988
7 0.00350598 −0.00790411 0.00482261 0.00680337 −0.0172930
8 0.000698188 −0.00620890 0.00479021 0.00678290 −0.0140074
9 −0.00189233 −0.00484806 0.00479036 0.00678314 −0.0115820
10 −0.000332809 −0.00372258 0.00479099 0.00678338 −0.00971779
11 −0.000466527 −0.00277480 0.00479089 0.00678336 −0.00823997
12 −0.000676916 −0.00196613 0.00479089 0.00678336 −0.00703965
13 −0.000562901 −0.00126876 0.00479089 0.00678336 −0.00604536
14 −0.000569340 −0.000661814 0.00479089 0.00678336 −0.00520823
15 −0.000586184 −0.000129283 0.00479089 0.00678336 −0.00449372
16 −0.000578161 0.000341368 0.00479089 0.00678336 −0.00387672
17 −0.000578345 0.000760068 0.00479089 0.00678336 −0.00333856
18 −0.000579652 0.00113478 0.00479089 0.00678336 −0.00286501
19 −0.000579095 0.00147194 0.00479089 0.00678336 −0.00244512
20 0.00177683 −0.00207024
100 0.00652292 0.00329682
500 0.00748377 0.00430074
2500 0.00767594 0.00449892
Another distinction is the rate at which the means µB , µC , and µC′ converge.
Notice that µC and µC′ converge very rapidly, having stabilized to six significant
digits by N = 11, 12, or 13 in each case. µB converges a little more slowly. By
N = 19, it has stabilized to three significant digits in the first case, six in the
second case, and four in the third case. As a consequence, it is unnecessary to
extend these calculations to larger N . If it were possible, the results would be
virtually identical. Contrast that with the situation for the approximate means
µˆB and µˆC′ of Li et al. [9]. As one can see from Tables 1–3, the convergence is
much slower.
Next, we use computer graphics to sketch, for games A′, B, and C ′, the
Parrondo and anti-Parrondo regions when 3 ≤ N ≤ 9. See Figure 3. We can
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Table 2: Analysis of the Parrondo effect for a second point (p0, p1, p2) =
(7/10, 17/25, 0) on the boundary of the unit cube.
N µB µˆB µC µC′ µˆC′
3 0.0710383 0.0710383 0.0297791 0.0525560 0.0525560
4 −0.0425713 0.0485411 0.00241457 0.000952648 0.0363651
5 0.00257895 0.0398300 0.00818232 0.00765099 0.0295117
6 −0.0102930 0.0349801 0.00721881 0.0136825 0.0256872
7 −0.00722622 0.0318731 0.00736816 0.00691714 0.0232447
8 −0.00808338 0.0297097 0.00734464 0.00691038 0.0215492
9 −0.00784318 0.0281159 0.00734835 0.00691100 0.0203035
10 −0.00790952 0.0268928 0.00734776 0.00691094 0.0193494
11 −0.00789119 0.0259243 0.00734786 0.00691095 0.0185954
12 −0.00789624 0.0251385 0.00734784 0.00691095 0.0179843
13 −0.00789485 0.0244881 0.00734784 0.00691095 0.0174792
14 −0.00789523 0.0239408 0.00734784 0.00691095 0.0170546
15 −0.00789513 0.0234740 0.00734784 0.00691095 0.0166927
16 −0.00789516 0.0230711 0.00734784 0.00691095 0.0163806
17 −0.00789515 0.0227198 0.00734784 0.00691095 0.0161086
18 −0.00789515 0.0224108 0.00734784 0.00691095 0.0158696
19 −0.00789515 0.0221369 0.00734784 0.00691095 0.0156577
20 0.0218925 0.0154688
100 0.0183996 0.0127773
500 0.0177477 0.0122767
2500 0.0176191 0.0121780
compare these figures with those of [6], for games A, B, and C, when 3 ≤ N ≤ 6.
(The reason we can go further in the present case than we did in [6] is that we
found a new method for sketching graphs without the need for explicit formulas.)
The figures for games A′, B, and C ′ are distinctively different from those for
games A, B, and C. In both cases, the general shape of the Parrondo and anti-
Parrondo regions does not change much, once N ≥ 5. In Figure 4, we sketch,
for games A′, B, and C ′, the approximate Parrondo and anti-Parrondo regions
when 3 ≤ N ≤ 10 and N = 20, based on the approximation of Li et al. [9]. We
see clearly that the approximation is poor.
6 Conclusions
• Parrondo games with N ≥ 3 players and one-dimensional spatial depen-
dence were introduced by Toral [3] and studied analytically by Mihailovic´
and Rajkovic´ [5] for N ≤ 12 and by Ethier and Lee [6] for N ≤ 19. The
additional seven cases in the latter work led to the conjecture that the
mean profits converge as N →∞, and this was subsequently proved in [7]
under certain conditions. The reason that larger N could be treated was
not because of faster computers but because of a state space reduction
method that requires for its justification that a lumpability condition be
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Table 3: Analysis of the Parrondo effect for a point (p0, p1, p2) = (1/10, 3/5, 3/4)
in the interior of the unit cube.
N µB µˆB µC µC′ µˆC′
3 −0.190476 −0.190476 −0.00671141 0.0250737 0.0250737
4 −0.0858189 −0.141636 0.0108365 0.0175362 0.0217807
5 −0.0389980 −0.106662 0.0141217 0.0169208 0.0202632
6 −0.0183165 −0.0807523 0.0147166 0.0336654 0.0193758
7 −0.00924232 −0.0609171 0.0148223 0.0168224 0.0187918
8 −0.00528548 −0.0453218 0.0148408 0.0168213 0.0183779
9 −0.00356984 −0.0327906 0.0148441 0.0168212 0.0180692
10 −0.00282963 −0.0225375 0.0148446 0.0168212 0.0178301
11 −0.00251155 −0.0140186 0.0148447 0.0168211 0.0176394
12 −0.00237531 −0.00684626 0.0148447 0.0168211 0.0174837
13 −0.00231709 −0.000737736 0.0148448 0.0168211 0.0173543
14 −0.00229226 0.00451782 0.0148448 0.0168211 0.0172449
15 −0.00228169 0.00908041 0.0148448 0.0168211 0.0171513
16 −0.00227719 0.0130734 0.0148448 0.0168211 0.0170703
17 −0.00227528 0.0165933 0.0148448 0.0168211 0.0169994
18 −0.00227446 0.0197165 0.0148448 0.0168211 0.0169370
19 −0.00227412 0.0225043 0.0148448 0.0168211 0.0168815
20 0.0250062 0.0168319
100 0.0610154 0.0161143
500 0.0674780 0.0159784
2500 0.0687331 0.0159515
satisfied by the Markov chains describing the Parrondo games.
• Xie et al. [8] modified Toral’s model by changing the nonspatial game
A to one with spatial dependence. Li et al. [9] studied these Parrondo
games using a state space reduction method that reduces the size of the
state space from 2N states to N + 1 states. However, the Markov chains
describing these modified Parrondo games fail to satisfy the lumpability
condition, with the result that the reduced Markov chains are inconsistent
with the model of Xie et al.
• Toral’s model as modified by Xie et al. [8] is studied in this paper using
the methods introduced in [6]. The lumpability condition is satisfied and
so the reduced Markov chains are consistent with the model of Xie at
al. This allows us to compare our exact results for this model with the
approximate ones of Li et al. [9]. We find that their approximation is poor
and that their results are misleading. This can be seen from Tables 1–3
or by comparing Figures 3 and 4. The same is true for large N as well, as
Tables 1–3 suggest.
• Li et al. [9] justified their approximation on the grounds that exact com-
putations are impossible for large N . While that may be true, we would
argue that computations for large N are unnecessary. The Parrondo re-
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gion stabilizes rather quickly as N → ∞. By N = 19, mean profits for
the Parrondo games under consideration have stabilized to three or more
significant digits. Although we cannot extrapolate with absolute mathe-
matical certainty, it seems safe to do so based on the computations that
have been done so far. See Tables 1–3, for example.
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N = 3 N = 4 N = 5
N = 6 N = 7
N = 8 N = 9
Figure 3: For 3 ≤ N ≤ 9 and γ = 1/2, the blue surface is the surface µB = 0,
and the red surface is the surface µC′ = 0, in the (p0, p2, p1) unit cube. The
Parrondo region is the region on or below the blue surface and above the red
surface, while the anti-Parrondo region is the region on or above the blue surface
and below the red surface.
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N = 9 N = 10 N = 20
Figure 4: For 3 ≤ N ≤ 10, N = 20, and γ = 1/2, the blue surface is the surface
µˆB = 0, and the red surface is the surface µˆC′ = 0, in the (p0, p2, p1) unit cube,
where µˆB and µˆC′ are the approximate means of Li et al. [9]. The (approximate)
Parrondo region is the region on or below the blue surface and above the red
surface, while the (approximate) anti-Parrondo region is the region on or above
the blue surface and below the red surface.
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